Holding the line: China's nuclear test moratorium turns 30

The global nuclear order is entering a period of renewed strain. Competition among major countries is intensifying, and some states are assigning nuclear weapons a larger role in national security doctrines and alliance planning. Nuclear sharing and extended deterrence are expanding, strategic missile defense capabilities are continuing to advance, and several major arms control agreements have lapsed.

The possibility of renewed nuclear testing has also returned to public debate. July 29, 2026, marks 30 years since China announced that it would suspend nuclear testing, effective the following day. Maintaining that moratorium through repeated changes in the international security environment has given China's nuclear policy a notable degree of stability, continuity, and predictability.

The Chinese government described its decision to suspend nuclear testing as both a response to the demands of non-nuclear-weapon states and a practical step toward nuclear disarmament. In September 1996, China became one of the first countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. Since then, it has observed the moratorium, upheld the object and purpose of the Treaty, supported its entry into force, and advanced domestic preparations for implementation. Three decades of continuous observance have made the moratorium an enduring element of China's nuclear policy and a sustained contribution to the international norm against nuclear testing.

The moratorium is consistent with China's nuclear strategy of self-defense. Among the five nuclear-weapon states recognized under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, China has conducted the smallest number of nuclear tests, all of which were conducted on its own territory. China is also the only nuclear-armed state to have made an unconditional pledge never to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances. China states that it maintains its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security and has never deployed nuclear weapons on foreign territory. It has also made an unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones and supports the establishment of such zones in accordance with relevant guidelines.

The history of nuclear testing helps explain why the concerns of non-nuclear-weapon states remain central to the test ban regime. More than 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted worldwide since 1945, leaving serious and lasting humanitarian and environmental consequences on the Pacific Islands, Central Asia, Africa, and elsewhere. Many developing countries played no part in the nuclear arms race, yet their communities endured radioactive contamination, intergenerational health effects, forced displacement, and the loss of traditional lands and livelihoods. China's 1996 announcement explicitly identified the demands of these states as an important consideration. In doing so, it reflected a broader principle: nuclear-weapon states should not shift the risks and costs of their security policies onto countries that do not possess nuclear weapons. The security concerns of the non-nuclear majority deserve a meaningful place in international nuclear governance.

An effective test ban regime requires more than strong institutions. It also depends on whether states can participate effectively in those institutions and make full use of their technical resources. China has regularly participated in meetings of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization and its subsidiary working groups. It has worked with the Provisional Technical Secretariat to organize workshops for national data centers and promote exchanges on the collection, analysis, and use of monitoring data. China has placed particular emphasis on strengthening implementation capacity in developing countries.

Since 2008, it has made repeated voluntary contributions to programs that enable experts from developing countries to participate in the work of the Preparatory Commission. Broader access to technical knowledge allows more states to assess monitoring information independently, strengthening both the representativeness and the effectiveness of the international verification system.

The credibility of the moratorium is further reinforced by sustained institutional and technical preparation. China has established a national data center and assumed responsibility for constructing 11 International Monitoring System stations and one radionuclide laboratory on its territory. Ten of the 11 stations have been completed, six of which have been certified and incorporated into the International Monitoring System.

Work has also continued on data analysis, personnel training, preparation for on-site inspections, and related technical research. Chinese experts have participated fully in negotiations on operational manuals and other guidance documents for the International Monitoring System, the International Data Center, and on-site inspections. Together, these efforts have strengthened domestic preparations for implementation and supported deeper international verification cooperation.

Nuclear testing bears directly on global strategic stability. If a nuclear-armed state were to resume testing, it would deepen strategic suspicion, alter expectations about weapons development, and place pressure on the moratoria maintained by others. It could also trigger a broader cycle of action and reaction, with serious consequences for global security.

China continues to support the central role of the United Nations in the international system and uses United Nations forums to advance nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation through dialogue and negotiation. It also promotes strategic communication among nuclear-armed states to reduce misunderstanding and miscalculation.

In February 2026, some US officials raised the possibility that China might have conducted a nuclear explosive test and referred to resuming US nuclear testing on what they described as an "equal basis" with other countries. The CTBTO's public technical findings did not substantiate that suggestion.

The organization stated that its International Monitoring System had detected no event consistent with the characteristics of a nuclear weapon test explosion, and that subsequent, more detailed analyses had not altered that determination.

China's Foreign Ministry said that it did not accept the US' assessment and reiterated that China supports the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and continues to observe its nuclear testing moratorium.

For any nuclear-armed state, continued observance of existing testing moratoria is especially important. Yet, allegations unsupported by verification evidence can be dangerous because they may distort strategic assessments and deepen mutual suspicion.

Over the past three decades, the international balance of power has shifted, military technologies have advanced, and the arms-control system has been increasingly under pressure. China's commitment to the nuclear-test moratorium has not changed.

This record demonstrates the strategic value of a stable nuclear policy backed by concrete action. It has strengthened the international norm against nuclear testing, responded to the security concerns of the Global South, and contributed to global strategic stability.

The lasting significance of China's 30-year moratorium lies in this combination of restraint, reliability, and responsibility.

The author is an assistant professor at China Foreign Affairs University.

The views don't necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

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