Deliverables before expansion

The SCO has evolved from a regional security mechanism to a broader Eurasian platform with focus increasingly expected on practical cooperation outcomes

Over the past 25 years, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization has undergone a substantial transformation. The most important change is that it has evolved from a relatively compact regional mechanism into a much larger transregional organization with a far broader agenda and a considerably more diverse membership.

Security remains a fundamental pillar, but the organization is now also engaged in transport, trade, investment, energy, the digital economy, artificial intelligence, environmental issues, water resources, education, culture and youth exchanges.

The SCO is not an integration project comparable to the European Union, nor is it a military-political bloc. Its main strength lies in its ability to maintain sustained dialogue among countries that differ significantly in their political systems, economic models, foreign-policy priorities and development stages, and, in some cases, have complicated bilateral relations.

At the same time, this is also where one of the SCO's present challenges lies. The broader the organization becomes, and the wider its agenda, the more difficult it is to ensure that political decisions are translated into practical results. The SCO's economic potential remains significantly greater than the number and scale of genuinely multilateral projects implemented under its framework.

Therefore, the next stage in the SCO's development should be defined less by geographic expansion and more by its ability to turn political agreements into concrete projects. This brings us directly to the question of what practical value participation in the SCO has brought Kazakhstan.

For Kazakhstan, the benefits should not be reduced to one particular project or a single economic indicator. The effect has been cumulative, and one of the SCO framework's most important contributions has been to support a more stable and predictable regional security environment.

For Kazakhstan, a country with a long border with China and located between major Eurasian powers, the transformation of the border from a potential source of strategic uncertainty into a space of regular cooperation was a major achievement. After the SCO was established, this security cooperation became more institutionalized. The Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure created a permanent mechanism for information exchange and coordination among the competent authorities of member states, while joint counter-terrorism activities and exercises became an established part of cooperation.

The security architecture has continued to evolve. At the Bishkek Summit on Sept 1, the leaders approved the regulations on the SCO Universal Center for Countering Security Challenges and Threats and the SCO Anti-Drug Center, enabling these institutions to move toward full operationalization. For Kazakhstan, the value lies in having a permanent multilateral channel for cooperation on terrorism, extremism, drug trafficking, transnational crime and emerging threats in the information and digital spheres.

Transport is another area where there are concrete results. In 2014, the SCO member states signed an intergovernmental agreement on creating favorable conditions for international road transport. It entered into force in 2017 and established a multilateral legal framework for road connectivity among participating states. Kazakhstan was directly involved in its implementation, including through the work of the joint commission. The agreement also supported discussions on transcontinental routes linking China through Kazakhstan with Russia and further toward Europe.

For Kazakhstan, this transport dimension is particularly important because of its geographical position. In recent years, Astana has promoted the idea of a network of strategic ports and logistics centers within the SCO framework. A corresponding concept was adopted in 2024, and in December 2025 the first meeting of heads of ports and logistics centers of SCO member states took place in Aktau.

This is closely linked to Kazakhstan's broader ambition to connect Chinese routes, the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route and the North-South Corridor. At the same time, it is important to avoid overstating the role of the SCO. Many major transport and infrastructure projects involving Kazakhstan are also being developed through bilateral arrangements, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Eurasian Economic Union and other frameworks. The SCO's role is better understood as providing an additional political and institutional platform for coordination.

The same qualification applies to trade. Kazakhstan's substantial trade with SCO members cannot be attributed to the organization alone; it is driven largely by bilateral economic relations, market dynamics and other regional frameworks. The SCO's practical contribution is to provide an additional platform for trade facilitation, customs cooperation, investment and reducing institutional barriers.

The proposed SCO Development Bank is a good example of both the organization's potential and its present limitations. A political decision to establish such a bank was agreed by interested member states at the Tianjin Summit on Sept 1, 2025. However, it is not yet an operational financial institution. Consultations are still continuing on its structure, funding mechanisms and governance.

Kazakhstan has supported this work and argues that a future SCO development finance mechanism could help fund infrastructure, technology and green projects. If successfully established, the bank could become an important step in moving the organization from declarations and programs toward project financing and implementation.

The humanitarian dimension also matters: educational, youth, cultural and academic exchanges, including cooperation through the SCO University network, help build the long-term mutual understanding necessary for a diverse Eurasian organization.

If one were to identify the most significant change produced by the SCO in a broader historical sense, I would point to the institutionalization of cooperation across the vast Eurasian space, giving very different countries a permanent framework for dialogue and consensus-building.

The organization's expansion, however, also raises a strategic question about its future. Should the SCO continue admitting new members, or should it now focus on deepening cooperation among those already inside the organization?

The SCO has reached a stage where the quality of cooperation is becoming more important than further quantitative expansion. This does not mean that the organization should close its doors to new partners. Openness has always been part of the SCO's philosophy, and enlargement has undoubtedly increased its international profile and political weight.

The admission of India and Pakistan in 2017, Iran in 2023 and Belarus in 2024 has expanded the organization's geographical reach and political significance. But at the same time, it has made the SCO more heterogeneous. Its 10 members have different economic priorities, foreign policy interests, security concerns and views on the preferred pace and depth of cooperation.

In an organization based on consensus, this inevitably makes decision-making more complex. It requires stronger diplomacy, more effective institutions and clearer priorities. That is why the immediate priority should be to consolidate what has already been created.

The SCO should not reject future enlargement. Rather, it should move away from the assumption that a larger membership automatically makes the organization stronger. A more useful principle would be that the strength of the SCO should be measured by the number and quality of projects its members are able to jointly implement.

This approach is broadly consistent with Kazakhstan's position. Astana has repeatedly called for greater efficiency within the SCO, stronger implementation of adopted decisions and better use of the organization's economic potential, particularly through investment projects, transport connectivity and effective financial mechanisms.

Several areas could demonstrate this practical shift. These include the establishment of the SCO Development Bank, the development of transport and logistics corridors, the digitization of customs and transport procedures, energy cooperation, food security, water cooperation, AI and new mechanisms in the field of security.

The SCO Development Bank is particularly illustrative. The political decision to create it has already been made, but the parameters are still under discussion. Its eventual ability to finance real cross-border projects will be an important test of whether the SCO can move from political declarations to practical implementation.

The SCO Tianjin Summit in September 2025 decided to merge the observer states and dialogue partners of the SCO into unified "SCO partners". This suggests that the organization is trying not merely to expand mechanically, but also to rationalize and simplify its external architecture.

For this reason, the most appropriate balance is that the SCO remains open to cooperation with interested countries, but the expansion of full membership should be gradual and should take into account the organization's ability to function effectively in a larger format.

The SCO is therefore entering an important transitional period. The central question is no longer simply how geographically large the organization can become, but how effective it can become in practice. Its future credibility will depend on preserving its consensus-based character while developing the institutional and financial capacity to deliver tangible results for its member states.

The author is the director of the China Studies Center (Kazakhstan).

The author contributed this article to China Watch, a think tank powered by China Daily. The views do not necessarily reflect those of China Daily.

Contact the editor at editor@chinawatch.cn.